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Abstract 
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are rapidly being combined with “big data” 
analytics processes and publicly available “open data sets”, which are usually outside the 
arena of the enterprise, to expand activity through better service to current clients as well as 
identifying new opportunities. Moreover, these activities are now largely based around 
relevant software systems hosted in a “cloud computing” environment. However, the over 50- 
year old phrase related to mistrust in computer systems, namely “garbage in, garbage out” or 
“GIGO”, is  used to describe problems of unqualified and unquestioning dependency on 
information systems. However, a more relevant GIGO interpretation arose sometime later, 
namely “garbage in, gospel out” signifying that with large scale information systems based 
around ERP and open datasets as well as “big data” analytics, particularly in a cloud 
environment, the ability to verify the authenticity and integrity of the data sets used may be 
almost impossible. In turn, this may easily result in decision making based upon questionable 
results which are unverifiable. Illicit “impersonation” of and modifications to legitimate data 
sets may become a reality while at the same time the ability to audit any derived results of 
analysis may be an important requirement, particularly in the public sector. The pressing need 
for enhancement of identity, reliability, authenticity and audit services, including naming and 
addressing services, in this emerging environment is discussed in this paper. Some current and 
appropriate technologies currently being offered are also examined. However, severe 
limitations in addressing the problems identified are found and the paper proposes further 
necessary research work for the area. 
(Note: This paper is based on an earlier unpublished paper/presentation “Identity, Addressing, 
Authenticity and Audit Requirements for Trust in ERP, Analytics and Big/Open Data in a 
‘Cloud’ Computing Environment: A Review and Proposal” presented to the Department of 
Accounting and IT, College of Management, National Chung Chen University, 20 November 
2013.) 
  
I. INTRODUCTION - DEPENDENCE 
 “Garbage in, garbage out” (Wikipedia 2013), or “GIGO” is a term used to describe the 
problem of dependency on the output of computer based information systems. The phrase 
dates from the 1960s. However, a cynical version appeared later, namely “garbage in, gospel 
out”, which indicated that in large scale systems the ability to verify the accuracy of relevant 
data sets by their content is almost impossible. In addition the provenance and veracity of 
used software processing elements may also be totally unknown. So-called “big data” 
structures amplify this concern particularly where ERP systems and data analytics processes 
are combined and employed. This also means that trust must be placed in the naming and 
addressing structures employed to identify, access and thus depend upon the veracity of 
entities chosen, particularly in a “cloud computing” environment. Even in the physical world 
of cities, as their size and complexity expanded, the need for a scheme of naming and 
addressing became essential. Thus a highly dependable and trustworthy naming/addressing 
scheme for the elements involved in any information system is essential. This must include 
the computers, data storage, files/datasets, programs and network elements used. Moreover, 
these schemes must now cope with very large scale and complex but rapidly changing 
structures as well as their existence in national and international regulatory and enterprise 
requirements. Usually, both audit and forensic requirements exist. These normally involve 
retention of transaction details, associated metadata, etc., often necessitating the retention of 
the “traversal” undertaken by an application on behalf of a user. Moreover, that “user” may 
no longer be a human person but rather a “thing” as in the “Internet-of-Things” (Weber 2010) 
which is rapidly growing and objects of all types become interconnected and co-dependent. 
Such systems are being created around a combination of the Internet’s data network protocol 
set with its associated hardware and software artifacts and “virtual machine (VM)” 
(Rosenblum and Garfinkel 2005) technology in the associated computers. These are then 
coupled with “World Wide Web (WWW)” based information handling processes. 
This naming and addressing problem, as it relates to current usage of cloud computing 
environments, is summarised by Celesti et al (2010) as follows. 
In cloud computing environments, as well as in all systems characterized by a 
high level of dynamism, naming and resource location become critical issues. 
Until now, the Internet has used the Domain Name System (DNS) for the 
resolution of domain names, that does not seem to be suitable to the new emerging 
cloud scenarios. 
However, equally critical is any associated identification and addressing scheme used within 
an actual computer, or virtual machine, employed which, in turn, must be mapped to from 
another system anywhere on the Internet. Celesti et al (2010) also state that in this 
environment “…the need of an effective cloud naming system should be characterized by: 
scalability, extensibility, services of description and discovery, name recycling, 
non-correlation, and name space integration mechanisms which avoid name conflicts.”  
However, in proposing that a new naming and addressing scheme is needed, they do not 
mention the critical importance of necessary trustworthiness and resilience with associated 
needs for reliable collection of audit and forensic data, including all necessary metadata.   
II.  OTHIS AND “REALMS”/REGIONS 
The “Open and Trusted Health Information Systems (OTHIS)” project at the Queensland 
University of Technology clearly identified distinct “realms” vital to the identification and 
authentication of elements within an e-health system. In such “realms”, complementary 
naming and addressing schemes may be needed. Moreover, these schemes must be able to 
“mesh” together as required for a resource to be clearly and unambiguously identified, 
authenticated and accessed. These realms were identified  (Liu 2011; Liu Caelli et al 2007a; 
Liu Caelli et al 2008a; Liu Caelli et al 2008b; Liu Caelli et al 2007b; Liu Caelli et al 2009a; 
Liu Caelli et al 2010; Liu Franco et al 2009b) as being: 
• Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC),  
• Health Informatics Application Security (HIAS), and 
• Health Informatics Network Security (HINS). 
The aim of the OTHIS project (Liu 2011; Liu et al 2007a; Liu et al 2009b) was: 
... to address privacy and security requirements at each level within a modern HIS 
architecture to ensure the protection of data from both internal and external 
threats. OTHIS has the capacity to ensure legal compliance of any HIS to 
appropriate legislative and regulatory requirements. 
This research recognised that trustworthy naming, addressing and authentication of data and 
software processes had clear roles to play in any overall security design and assessment.  It 
also recognised that the above “realms” concept may be generalized into extension of broader 
aspects of trusted/trustworthy “access control” including authentication and authorization (at 
the computer system level), application security (at the database and software process levels) 
and network security (at the data interconnection level).  For example, it was identified by 
Henrickson et al (2007) and Croll et al (2007) that naming and resource 
location/authentication and access control in connected computer systems presented radically 
different approaches when “Discretionary Access Control (DAC)” were compared to 
“Mandatory Access Control (MAC)” structures provided by an operating system  
(Department of Defense 1985). 
Naming, addressing and authentication, with associated audit and forensic services, of 
the entities in each of these realms have become critical security concerns. This also includes 
the vital aspect of trust in the systems that actually perform these naming, addressing and 
authentication processes. For usage of a “public cloud” environment, in particular, the 
situation takes on a new dimension in that the processes involved may themselves be 
virtualised and distributed over systems on a global basis. 
III. NAMING AND ADDRESSING IN AN AGE OF “CLOUD COMPUTING” 
“Cloud computing” systems are built upon much earlier naming and addressing schemes 
with associated and differing levels of assurance, from a public network environment to a 
closed computer system. A number of suggestions have therefore been suggested for an 
extension of these earlier schemes to address the cloud environment. These are largely based 
around extending the concepts of the “Uniform Resource Locator (URL)” associated with the 
World-Wide –Web (Davis and Reed ; Dong Yajuan et al 2006). 
Earlier attempts at secure and manageable naming and addressing schemes include: 
• the X.500 directory scheme for the “Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)” model 
proposed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), coupled with 
the actual OSI model itself and its security standard (International Standard IS 
7498-2); 
• proprietary systems used for service identification in such network products as 
IBM’s “System Network Architecture (SNA)”, “Digital Equipment Corporation 
Network (DECNET), Novell Network scheme, NetBIOS from Microsoft, etc.; 
• the “World-Wide-Web (WWW)” Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and allied 
URI/URN scheme; 
• earlier “Data Dictionary (DD)” concepts and systems; 
• current “Application Programming Interface (API)” structures for “Open Data” 
integration and, 
• the current Internet “Domain Name System (DNS)” and its “Domain Name 
System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)”. 
 
However, dependence now exists on the DNS which dates from around November 1983, 
over 30 years ago. This was also the same year that the newer Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol set replaced the earlier Network Control 
Program (NCP) protocol (Miller 2010). At the time, the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network (ARPANET) consisted of only some 68 nodes but rapid expansion was foreseen. 
The scheme for the now Internet, then ARPANET, based naming and addressing 
structure grew out of the problem of maintaining and distributing a centralized file of relevant 
data (hosts.txt) as the then ARPANET expanded. The relevant RFC stated as follows 
(Mockapetris 1983): 
As applications grow to span multiple hosts, then networks, and finally internets, 
these applications must also span multiple administrative boundaries and related 
methods of operation (protocols, data formats, etc).  The number of resources 
(for example mailboxes), the number of locations for resources, and the diversity 
of such an environment cause formidable problems when we wish to create 
consistent methods for referencing particular resources that are similar but 
scattered throughout the environment. 
That Internet standard stated the problem as being one of a basic need for a “consistent 
name space which will be used for referring to resources.  In order to avoid the problems 
caused by ad hoc encodings, names should not contain addresses, routes, or similar 
information as part of the name.”  However, this, and its related later standards, did not 
address the critical problem of security and resilience of the actual naming and addressing 
system as it took a central and critical role in the global Internet, particularly after 1988. A 
strict hierarchical naming form was proposed with an associated name to address resolution 
structure.  Indeed RFC 882 (Mockapetris 1983) clearly stated that the overall plan was for a 
scheme whereby “the domain name space is a tree structure.” This seemed appropriate at the 
time given the provenance of the then ARPANET and its management/control structures. 
Interestingly, it was not until some 14 years later that the problem of overall security of the 
DNS was considered via the “Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)” RFC set. 
The basic DNSSEC RFC stated as follows (Eastlake and Kaufman 1997): 
The Domain Name System (DNS) has become a critical operational part of the 
Internet infrastructure yet it has no strong security mechanisms to assure data 
integrity or authentication. 
The use of DNSSEC technology, and required hardware/software subsystems, is, however, 
limited and almost non-existent in the private sector.  This is significant as globally stored 
datasets and software processes, often managed and controlled by third party system 
providers, become the norm and these are integrated into enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems which now encompass all management aspects of any large scale enterprise’s 
activities, public or private. In this situation, private enterprise data sets may be combined 
with other, often “open”, data sets from public or government sources, such as for planning 
market development activity, optimizing distribution and stocking schemes, managing supply 
chains, etc. A major research question is one of whether or not the DNSSEC architecture can 
be expanded to meet the new requirements for assured identification, addressing and 
authentication in a cloud computing environment combining multiple resources from highly 
varying sources. One extension of DNSSEC, the “DANE” proposal, from the “DNS-based 
Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)” working group of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), sets out a proposition to answer this entity authentication need in the Internet as 
follows (Barnes 2012). 
Authentication of domain names is a fundamental function for Internet security. In 
order for applications to protect information from unauthorized disclosure, they 
need to make sure that the entity on the far end of a secure connection actually 
represents the domain that the user intended to connect to. 
DANE proposes a new “chain of trust” that may be employed to increase confidence in 
data and programs used in a global Internet environment. However, this proposal does not 
extend below the “network realm”, as identified in OTHIS, to the authentication of the 
individual assets within a real or virtual computer system that an ERP or data analytics system 
may use and depend upon. 
At the same time the concept of “Unified Communications (UC)” (Riemer and Taing 
2009) has developed. As the structure of the global telecommunications infrastructure rapidly 
changes, from the “public switched telephone network (PSTN)” (Liu and Ansari 2008) to 
“packet switching” technologies information services for any enterprise are being combined 
into a single, Internet protocol based facility, with such technologies as “voice-over-internet 
protocol (VoIP)” (Goode 2002) etc. Thus the Internet’s DNS is coming under major pressure 
to incorporate these changes. This even further accentuated as enterprises, large and small, 
employ cloud computing incorporating both “virtual machine (VM)” and “virtual network 
(VN)” technologies. For example, the “private branch exchange (PBX)” (Muller 2002), 
offering traditional voice/switched circuit services, is being rapidly replaced by UC services. 
Almeida and Lourenco (2011) state that UC has the potential to improve enterprise 
communications and reduce business operating costs. However, Bradley and Shah (2010) 
outline no less than 11 major threats to the security of the UC environment, many of which 
involve trust in the naming and addressing scheme in use once the security of the earlier 
switched circuit system is removed. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
“ENUM” (E.164) standard addresses this problem as indicated in a “Wikipedia” entry as 
follows. 
Telephone number mapping is a system of unifying the international telephone 
number system of the public switched telephone network with the Internet 
addressing and identification name spaces. Internationally, telephone numbers 
are systematically organized by the E.164 standard, while the Internet uses the 
Domain Name System (DNS) for linking domain names to IP addresses and other 
resource information. Telephone number mapping systems provide facilities to 
determine applicable Internet communications servers responsible for servicing a 
given telephone number using DNS queries. The most prominent facility for 
telephone number mapping is the E.164 Number Mapping (ENUM) standard. It 
uses special DNS record types to translate a telephone number into a Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI) or IP address that can be used in Internet 
communications. 
Van der Berg (2010) refers to this accelerating change and the need for nation states to 
carefully evaluate any transition from technical, control/management, legal and public policy 
aspects. The security requirements for any “ENUM” registry at a national level must be 
thoroughly analyzed. However, major research into this problem cannot be readily identified. 
Moreover, adoption of the ENUM standard has to first occur and it appears that, at present, 
few nations have moved in this direction. A database held by the RIPE ENUM group 
(Réseaux IP Européens) details the practical problems in adoption of this standard. For 
example, this report claims that for Australia any ENUM project is “in hiatus”, viz. not 
progressing since “ ... due to the current lack of interest in ENUM, a commercial 
implementation should not be established at this time.”  Similarly, for Taiwan as a further 
example, this report claims that “although the User-ENUM domain for country code 886 has 
been delegated, no information for enumdata.org has yet been provided by the delegatee.” 
However, in reality the adoption of VoIP and allied video services has rapidly progressed at 
the enterprise level, i.e. replacing the functions of the earlier PBX on the enterprise side. 
These security challenges need to be urgently addressed as any ENUM based national 
telecommunications structure develops. 
IV. ERP, ANALYTICS AND “BIG/OPEN DATA” – CORRECT RESOURCES? 
The above considerations, of course, apply to the “network realm” as identified in the 
OTHIS project (Liu 2011; Liu et al 2007a; Liu et al 2008a; Liu et al 2008b; Liu et al 2007b; 
Liu et al 2009a; Liu et al 2010; Liu et al 2009b) and normally do not address naming and 
addressing inside a host, or even a client, computer system, virtual or real, client or server. In 
the computer system case secure and reliable naming and addressing structures depend upon 
the level of granularity to be catered for. At a higher/system level, an appropriate file system 
holding both data and program entities, takes on this responsibility with protection of that 
“file structure” left to access control subsystems enforced by the operating system. At a next 
level, e.g. the “database” level, such structures as a “database schema” or associated 
“metadata” may identify the elements composing a database and their relationships.  These 
entities may then be accessed by a name using, for example, a “query language” such as SQL 
or by direct named reference from an application program through an associated API. 
In any enterprise environment employing ERP systems the situation in regard to 
trustworthy naming and addressing is rapidly becoming more complex. At one level, such as 
at an enterprise’s own individual ERP level, proprietary data sets employed are usually 
enterprise specific and protected under appropriate entity rule sets set out by the organisation. 
However, ERP today is making use of “external” datasets to develop appropriate business 
plans, e.g. national demographic data sets from governmental entities may be incorporated for 
the development of better business planning, etc. For example, human resource/personnel 
planning may draw upon open social networks such as “LinkedIN” as well as “in-house” data 
to enhance appropriate analysis of employment requirements, and so on.  In turn, even larger 
scale or “big data” collected by the enterprise itself over time may be the subject of data 
analytics to further provide background for ERP activity. 
The concept of a “data dictionary” was a common theme for many years as database 
technology gained widespread acceptance from the 1970s. It was defined as follows by IBM 
in 1993 (IBM Corporation 1993): 
data dictionary n.  
A centralized repository of information about data such as meaning, relationships 
to other data, origin, usage, and format. It assists management, database 
administrators, system analysts, and application programmers in planning, 
controlling, and evaluating the collection, storage, and use of data. 
A “data dictionary (DD)” (IBM Corporation 1993) contains all the necessary metadata 
needed to answer access requests but without any security requirements clearly defined. As 
discussed later, an enhanced data dictionary concept may be a candidate for the assurance 
needed for data and process entity access control and authentication needed in a cloud 
environment. However, this concept places a greater reliance on the trust and thus security of 
the data dictionary itself. This mirrors earlier concepts of a separate and verified access 
control sub-system as a vital part of any basic operating system design. 
All of these processes make assumptions about the correctness of data/metadata used. In 
particular, where external data sets are used and relied upon the need to trust the provenance 
of those data sets is a paramount concern, as already alluded to.  This concern now extends 
to the files or data sets that in the past were under strict control of the enterprise itself, through 
the support and maintenance of them on in-house computer and data network systems, but 
which now may reside on a public cloud computing service. She and Thursisingham (2007) 
have already affirmed that security is critical for ERP systems.  However, with ERP related 
data moving to both private and public cloud systems environments earlier sureties have 
disappeared and trust must now be placed in the security of any cloud system, public or 
private, and its provider/operator. 
V. THE “OPEN DATA” MOVEMENT – INTEGRATION INTO ERP / 
ANALYTICS – AUDIT AND FORENSICS NEEDS 
Further candidates for the enhancement of security for naming, addressing, 
authentication and access control services in an emerging cloud computing environment may 
involve use of the technologies being employed in the “open data” movement. Essentially, 
the “open data” movement, now being embraced by government worldwide, sets out to make 
available the “raw” data held, but often closed, by public sector and other related enterprises. 
For example (see Figure 1), the State of Queensland, Australia, has now placed some 499 
datasets onto an open server to encourage development of new software and services using 
that data (Queensland Government 2013) while the UK has placed 10,333 such datasets, as at 
October 2013, into its open data website.  
 
Figure 1. Websites for dataset provisioning. 
The “open data” concept has been explained in a Wikipedia entry as “the idea that 
certain data should be freely available to everyone to use and republish as they wish, without 
restrictions from copyright, patents or other mechanisms of control. The goals of the open 
data movement are similar to those of other "Open" movements such as open source, open 
hardware, open content, and open access. The philosophy behind open data has been long 
established (for example in the Mertonian tradition of science), but the term "open data" itself 
is recent, gaining popularity with the rise of the Internet and World Wide Web and, especially, 
with the launch of open-data government initiatives such as Data.gov and Data.gov.uk.”  A 
key element of the “open data” (Miller Styles et al 2008) concept is that anyone may use 
offered datasets for any purpose free from onerous overriding restrictions but with some 
conditions that the provenance of the data is acknowledged and any passing on of the data via, 
say, an application is likewise unrestricted. However, software products incorporating such 
data may be offered for sale commercially.  This is again emphasized by the appropriate 
definition given by the “Open Knowledge Foundation” (URL http://okfn.org/opendata/ ) 
which states that “Open data is data that can be freely used, reused and redistributed by 
anyone – subject only, at most, to the requirement to attribute and sharealike.” The movement 
should be compared to, and be seen as an outgrowth of, similar activities such as the “open 
source” movement covering availability of software systems but with some notable 
differences in relation to software product sale commercially. However, the major problem to 
be solved is standardization for definition of necessary metadata structures. A complimentary 
research challenge is that of incorporation of appropriate integrity and authenticity checks into 
such metadata structures.  Moreover, the necessity for such security enhancement of the 
overall open data concept needs to be embraced and studied by associated public policy and 
legal entities.  
The State of Queensland has offered prizes for applications that “...demonstrate the most 
innovative use of and real outcomes from public data.”  Similarly, in Taiwan, similar efforts 
to promote the “open data” cause have recently occurred through the formation of an alliance 
which was established in September 2013 following the earlier adoption of the open data 
cause by the Government of Taiwan. It is vital in this situation that the veracity of any dataset 
used can be tested prior to any major application development occurring along with trusted 
ongoing maintenance of the data set. Trust will be placed in any output from such applications 
given that such data may be readily and legally “re-published” with the associated software 
product.  This may occur under an appropriate legal arrangement, such as through the 
“Creative Commons” concept.  In the case of Queensland, the “CKAN” facility is used to 
enable access to datasets and elements. The CKAN facility, from the “Open Knowledge 
Foundation” is described as follows (Open Knolwedge Foundation). 
CKAN is a powerful data management system that makes data accessible – by 
providing tools to streamline publishing, sharing, finding and using data. CKAN 
is aimed at data publishers (national and regional governments, companies and 
organizations) wanting to make their data open and available. 
It offers a range of facilities including an “Application Programming Interface (API)” for use 
by software developers but does not, at present, offer verification and any allied security 
mechanisms or services, similar to the proposals in the OSI security model, for example. 
However, a number of alternatives and complimentary services and sub-systems exist, 
such as the “Representational State Transfer (REST)” scheme which has been defined as 
follows (Rodriguez 2008). 
REST defines a set of architectural principles by which you can design Web 
services that focus on a system's resources, including how resource states are 
addressed and transferred over HTTP by a wide range of clients written in 
different languages. If measured by the number of Web services that use it, REST 
has emerged in the last few years alone as a predominant Web service design 
model. 
Once again, however, REST does not attempt to answer any underlying security concerns and, 
in fact, leaves these to the web servers involved via control and management of responses to 
requests. 
Thus, research is urgently needed into the security mechanisms and services offered, 
planned to be offered or not offered at all, by these emerging “open data” service systems. A 
key question is one of whether or not they can be extended to meet the authentication and 
resilience needs of a comprehensive naming and addressing system operating in a global 
cloud computing environment. 
At the same time, dependence on ERP results by any organisation dictates that 
appropriate audit records are maintained in case of dispute, legal/forensic needs or to further 
enhance opportunities. Such audit records are usually required in any legal “discovery” 
situation related to litigation or police investigation. Data, transactions, program/process 
invocation and metadata may all be elements whose access and usage need to be recorded in 
audit records even where records are created from both internal and external resources. At 
present there appears to be little to no consideration of these requirements in the technologies 
and sub-systems being developed or used. Legislative requirements may even exist that 
require such records to be created and stored for later analysis. The research problem here is 
one of elucidating and defining mechanisms for the identification and description of such 
requirements in such a way as to be able to include them in any data dictionary like structure 
used to provide a solution to the need along with the associated enforcement processes.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN TRUST FOR NAMING, 
ADDRESSING, AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL IN THE 
“CLOUD” FOR ERP/OPEN-BIG DATA 
Research directions in the area of large scale systems for ERP and analytics in support of 
enterprise development must address the urgent need for new structures for reliable, scalable 
and secure/trusted naming and addressing schemes for entities maintained and accessed via a 
global Internet. Moreover, computational and data storage elements will be based, in many 
cases, around various forms of “cloud computing” (Armbrust Fox et al 2010) particularly for 
large private and public enterprises.  At the same time, the “open data” movement has 
commenced and access to large public dataset collections will compliment usage of internal 
datasets used by an ERP system. At the same time, the need for high trust audit record 
creation and storage has accelerated with growing requirements being set out in legislative 
instruments at national and regional levels aimed at assisting in forensic accounting (Skalak 
Golden et al 2011) procedures. 
A number of immediate research directions can be readily identified. These include: 
• Provisioning of necessary and verifiable authentication and integrity controls in 
the metadata structures proposed for open data sets, potentially based on current 
markup-language schemes and any potential interaction with associated metadata 
schemes in use for proprietary ERP facilities; 
• Incorporation of the DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security) architecture into 
access verification processes for both open data sets and closed ERP databases 
where application systems are involved; 
• Implications of the movement to IPv6 structures, with associated IPSec and 
related facilities, for access to both proprietary ERP related and open datasets; 
• Development of the concept of mandatorily enforced “profiles” in relation to 
access control parameters for ERP and open data systems;  
• Clear identification of “realms” or sub-structures that can be independently 
managed and secured while maintaining an overall security posture, involving 
possible examination of the earlier “Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)” model 
security architecture espoused in international standard IS 7498-2 with its 
associated security mechanisms/services structure and layering concept; 
• Definition of a security meta-structure that allow for security parameters that may 
radically differ from data set to data set and any associated programs/processes, 
e.g. from ERP related data to open data sets, that allows for disparate open data 
interfaces (APIs) to be used.  
 
This paper has considered some candidate technologies for the comprehensive task of 
addressing security and trustworthiness requirements in ERP schemes incorporating both 
enterprise-controlled and open, third-party collections. More research, design, development, 
testing and experimentation are all required. Researchers need to define and build small 
demonstrator systems that may be used to clarify basic concepts and engineering/information 
system principles along with determination of appropriate design and implementation 
parameters. In addition, the usual performance and trustworthiness/security factors need to be 
incorporated. Any viable solution set must be implementable using currently accepted and 
understood information technology development and testing systems, usually based around 
the World-Wide-Web paradigm and an environment where end-user systems may be widely 
varied and of unknown security status. This requirement for new levels of overall information 
system security is, of course, exacerbated by the “Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD)” (Potts 
2012) phenomenon, particularly when considering use of “big data” analytics techniques and 
enterprise ERP systems, along with “open data” from public sources, for the presentation of 
important, confidential and actionable results to enterprise management in both the public and 
private sectors. Overall, it appears that a new paradigm is required for the enhancement of the 
trustworthiness of an extended naming and addressing scheme for “cloud computing” based 
elements existing internationally connected to a globally connected Internet.  
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